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Abstract
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial
phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine
his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship
increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much
we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored.
Only by giving to the partner the possibility to mis-behave he might
be tempted to do it, and only in this case there is a chance to learn
his type at a time where separation would be possible at a relatively
low cost.
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1 Introduction
The need to test the reliability of potential partners at the beginning of a
project is a typical feature of many human relationships, not only of an eco-
nomic nature. This need is particularly strong in the frequent cases in which,
once the project starts, a separation from unreliable partners becomes more
difficult. It is therefore not surprising that many partnerships feature, either
explicitly or implicitly, an initial period of “probation” in which the persons
involved monitor each other and decide, before it is “too late”, whether to
go on with the relationship or not. What is perhaps more surprising is that
monitoring partners permanently during these probation periods may not be
optimal, and in this paper we want to show why.
The intuition is simple. Consider an engagement before marriage in which
the woman wants to test the loyalty of the potential husband (or vice versa
if you prefer). A simplification not too far from reality is to assume that
there are two types of men: those who will never betray their partner and
those who instead might fall to the temptation of a love affair if an attractive
occasion materializes. In order to find out to which type of men the potential
husband belongs, the fiancee might try to spend as much time as possible
with him, monitoring him closely in all his daily and night activities. In
this way she would apparently learn a lot about him, but effectively she
would not learn the most important thing to be learned, which is how the
potential husband behaves when, as during marriage, he is not monitored
continuously. Only by giving the partner the possibility to mis-behave he
might be tempted to do it, and only in this case his type could possibly be
revealed when separating would still be feasible at low cost.
A similar situation characterizes labor market contracts where probation-
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ary periods are often specified explicitly. Note that the distinctive feature of
these periods is not to make monitoring possible, but to be periods in which
firing is allowed at a relatively low cost. Even when probation is not explic-
itly foreseen in a contract, various reasons (e.g. sunk costs or investments in
job specific human capital) make it easier to fire a worker earlier in a career
rather than later. In all these cases we argue that too much monitoring at
the beginning of the relationship is not optimal, because it prevents the firm
from learning how the worker behaves when she is not monitored. As in
the case of the engagement before marriage, the firm is typically interested
in discriminating between two types of potential employees: those who are
“unconditional cooperators”, and therefore exert a maximum level of effort
in all instances, and those who are instead “rational shirkers”, and would
therefore indulge in laziness if the cost of effort is high and the probability of
detection sufficiently low. Inasmuch as the “rational shirkers” can mimic the
behavior of the “unconditional cooperators” during probation, continuous
monitoring (“keeping the office door always open”) is suboptimal because
the probability of detection would be too high and the “rational shirker”
would never concede to the temptation of being “lazy”. As a result the two
types of workers would be observationally identical during probation, and
only when firing becomes costly would the true types be revealed. On the
contrary, random monitoring (“opening the door not too often and with no
specific pattern”) might be more revealing because the “rational shirker”
would be induced to take a chance to be lazy. Thus, only in this case would
there be a chance that the two types of workers might be caught behaving
differently.
Also in the case of trading between firms, and in general between “buy-
ers” and “sellers”, the same type of result might apply. Most firms write
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long-term contracts with other firms to obtain inputs for their production
process. The selection of partners for the provision of inputs may be subject
to a trial period similar to the one that characterizes labor or marriage con-
tracts. What this paper suggests is that these periods would be totally unin-
formative about the reliability of the trading partners if the buyer announced
his willingness to monitor extensively the quality of the input acquired dur-
ing trial. If the unreliable sellers knew that they would be fully monitored
during trial, they would try to make their product indistinguishable from the
product of reliable sellers. However, this would offer no guarantee that the
product would be of high quality after the long-term contract is signed.
Note that our argument does not apply only to long-term relationships
but is also relevant for one-shot interactions in which the reliability of a
partner is so important that it becomes crucial to test it before the main
interaction starts. Thus, our intuition is in principle relevant for many kinds
of human relationships, but of course not for all of them. Therefore, in the
light of the above examples and before going into a formal description of our
model in Section 3, it may be useful to clarify, within a generic “principal-
agent” framework, what is needed for our intuition to apply. We will do
this in the next section at the end of which it will be evident that the set of
relevant cases is quite large.
2 The necessary ingredients
First, there must be heterogeneity of agents with respect to the cost of exert-
ing effort, an hypothesis which probably characterizes most human relation-
ships and which is for example strongly supported by the evidence described
in Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and Taylor (2002) and Ichino and Riphahn
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(2003).1 Without loss of generality, we distinguish between “good” agents
who are willing to exert effort unconditionally and “bad” agents who instead
face effort costs and therefore are potential shirkers. Since a shirking agent
yields a negative payoff to the principal, the latter is interested in identifying
bad agents in order to stop the relationship with them.
Second, splitting from an agent must become more costly for the principal
as the length of the relationship increases. Although this assumption restricts
somewhat the set of relevant cases, it captures a feature that often charac-
terizes long-term relationships. This feature is sometimes a consequence of
institutional arrangements, like engagements in the marriage market and
probation periods in the labor market, but the existence of such an explicit
reference to a trial period is not necessary for our story. Splitting may be-
come increasingly difficult also because of sunk costs paid at some point
during the relationship or because of the accumulation of match-specific cap-
ital that would be too costly to destroy in case of splitting up. For any of the
above reasons, the principal is interested in identifying bad agents as early
as possible, in order not to remain stuck with them when firing becomes too
expensive. On the other hand, for the same reasons, bad agents have an ex-
tremely strong incentive to mimic good agents, because when firing becomes
too costly for the principal they can shirk at no risk.2
1 The first paper analyzes data from a field experiment in which the monitoring rate is
varied to see how people react to it in terms of shirking. It finds that, although there are
many “rational shirkers”, a significant proportion of agents does not take advantage when
the monitoring rate goes down and can thus be classified as “unconditional cooperators”.
The second one compares the absenteeism rate of newly hired workers during and after
probation in a large Italian bank. 42% of them are never absent while among the others
an increase in absenteeism is observed on average when incentives change at the end of
probation.
2The principal’s attempt to find out an agent’s type induces bad agents to try to mimic
good types which makes both types to appear more similar. This feature is reminiscent
to models of reputation games á la Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) and
Fudenberg and Levine (1992). On the other hand, in Mailath and Samuelson (2001), it is
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Third, we consider only situations in which it is either impossible or too
costly to design menus of contracts capable of “screening” between the two
types of workers. Once again, this should not appear as a particularly restric-
tive assumption, since in any realistic setup, the number of different contracts
which can be offered by a principal is “finite”, so that there might still exist
some degree of heterogeneity among agents who choose a particular contract.
In the extreme case frequently encountered in real-world labor markets, there
are institutional constraints such that workers who do the same job must also
get the same (fixed) wage. This is the case we consider but our results do
not qualitatively change as long as the type space is “richer” than the space
of potential contracts to offer so that there is heterogeneity for each differ-
ent type of contract. Moreover, our setting implies that bad types have a
strong incentive to mimic good types, since they would otherwise be fired
when choosing the contract designed for them. Thus, such screening con-
tracts either do not exist, or even if they do, it would be relatively expensive
for the principal to use them because of the significant rents to be offered
to agents to satisfy the incentive and the participation constraints. After
all, the fact that probation periods exist in many long-term relationships of
different nature indicates that it is not so easy to define menus of contracts
capable of implementing an efficient screening of workers.
Fourth, the monitoring of agents must be possible and thus constitute a
feasible means to identify bad agents. When using the monitoring device,
the principal can observe the effort decision of an agent in such a way that
a good type who can take an action to distinguish himself from a bad (inept) type. Avery
and Meyer (2003) analyze a model in which both types of agents may act strategically. They
show that it is possible to have two kinds of equilibria: one in which the two types appear
more similar in which case the degree of informativeness for the principal is relatively
low, and one in which they appear more distinct from each other so that the degree of
informativeness is larger.
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the effort choice becomes in fact “observable” although it remains “non-
verifiable” in court. Thus a contract cannot condition on it. However, during
the probation period, splitting is possible (or has lower cost) precisely in the
sense that there is no need to verify misbehavior in court in order to end the
relationship.
Whenever these four conditions are met, the principal faces a trade off
when deciding on the optimal monitoring policy for the probation period. On
the one hand, with zero monitoring the principal would have no chance of
detecting a bad agent and thus some monitoring is beneficial for the principal.
On the other hand, there is a countervailing effect since monitoring induces
bad types to exert effort in the probation period, thereby preventing their
identification.
As explained above, our main result is that even if monitoring is costless,
there is an incentive to choose a relatively small monitoring frequency in
order to induce some of the bad types to shirk in the probation period. Note
that the mere objective of filtering out bad agents is sufficient to generate this
result, and assuming monitoring to be costless makes our point particularly
striking, as, with monitoring costs, the optimal monitoring rate would be
even lower. Thus, our result is qualitatively different from the literature on
law enforcement building on Becker (1968) in which the fact that optimal
detection probabilities are typically less than one is driven by the presence
of enforcement costs (see also Besanko and Spulber (1989) and Polinsky and
Shavell (2000)).
In the Personnel Economics literature, probation is often rationalized
as an institution aimed at screening workers in the presence of unobservable
worker productivity (see e.g. Guasch and Weiss (1981), Sadanand, Sadanand,
and Marks (1989), and Bull and Tedeschi (1989)), but we are not aware of a
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literature signaling the existence of the above-mentioned trade-off and study-
ing its implications. The paper by Wang and Weiss (1998) is, to some extent,
related to the point we want to make. They analyze in a more general setting
the possibility of using random tests to screen workers during probation, in
combination with wage schedules which differ according to the outcome of
the test. By highlighting this combination of tools, they show that “exces-
sive monitoring” can deter low productivity workers from applying for jobs,
thereby making the pool of applicants endogenous. Independently from their
intuition, however, our story would apply whenever there is some residual
heterogeneity, e.g. concerning the propensity towards shirking, after agents
have been hired. Note that the two stories together suggest the possibility
that the firm’s ex ante commitment to excessive monitoring in order to deter
bad applicants may be time-inconsistent when the screening process is not
perfect and the firm hires bad workers in equilibrium.3
Our analysis is also related to Cowen and Glazer (1996) and Dubey and
Wu (2001) who show that a principal might benefit from having a less accu-
rate picture of agents. In the first paper, in trying to exceed a given threshold,
an agent might exert more effort when he is monitored with low frequency
only. This is because the risk of not exceeding the threshold is higher when
he has “fewer chances” and this may increase his effort incentives. In the
second paper, the principal wants to induce maximum effort by all agents.
Agents have different skills and are monitored at random. The agent with the
highest observed output receives a prize. To also give the low ability agents
a chance to win the prize, the principal might have an interest in keeping the
3The importance of commitment power is also stressed in the literature on law en-
forcement and auditing where the problem of time inconsistency is also prevalent (see e.g.
Kaplow and Shavell (1994)). See Khalil (1997) for a model in which the principal cannot
commit in advance to a monitoring rate.
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sample of observations small (i.e. to monitor less often) since large samples
would tend to favor high ability agents as they are more likely to produce
a high output. In both papers, less monitoring may lead to more effort and
may therefore be preferred by the principal. Contrary to that, in our paper,
less monitoring leads to more shirking and this is beneficial for the principal
because it allows to screen the different types of agents. Moreover, the result
in the second paper is driven by the competition among agents for the prize,
while our argument does not rely on interaction among agents.
The rest of this paper is devoted to analyzing formally what we have so
far described intuitively.
3 The Model
We consider one principal facing N ≥ 1 agents in a relationship lasting at
most two periods i = 1, 2. Period 1 is a probation period while period 2 is
the time after probation. In each period, agents can choose an action from
{E, S} where E and S denote “exerting effort” and “shirking”, respectively.
A shirking agent produces 0 output, while, when exerting effort, each agent
produces vi in period i. We have in mind situations in which the output of
an agent’s effort in period 1 is negligible compared to period 2, and thus we
assume v1 = 0 and v2 > 0.
4 We interpret v2 as a Net Present Value thereby
allowing period 2 to be of any length relative to the probation period. In
particular, period 2 could last for some time so that v2 would reflect the
overall discounted output in a long-term relationship, or period 2 could be
short indicating, for example, that the principal benefits from the effort of
the agent only at a single (but maybe particularly important) occasion.
4To assume v1 = 0 allows us to better highlight our basic result but this neither affects
its validity nor its generality. We will briefly comment on the case v1 > 0 in section 4.
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Although all agents are equally valuable to the principal when exerting
effort, they differ with respect to the (privately known) cost of doing so which
is represented by a parameter θ ∈ {G, B}: “bad types”, denoted by B, have
effort costs ci in period i, where c1 = c, c2 = k · c with k > 0, and where c is
drawn from a distribution H(c) ∈ C2 with support [0,1] at the beginning of
the game. The parameter k is simply a proportionality factor which allows
for appropriately adjusting and discounting effort costs with respect to the
length of period 2 relative to period 1. Furthermore, k can also be thought
to reflect potential differences in the intensity of effort required during and
after probation. On the other hand “good types”, denoted by G, do not face
any costs of exerting effort.5 In the population of agents, the shares of good
and bad types are α and (1−α), respectively, where 0 < α < 1. Concerning
the informational environment, we assume that each agent privately learns
his type at the beginning of the game and that α and H(·) are common
knowledge.
Period 1 is a probation period in which the principal can monitor each
agent at no cost. His choice variable is thus a probability of monitoring q ∈
[0, 1]. The outcome of the monitoring process is captured by a variable M ∈
{E, S} which perfectly reveals when shirking has occurred. After observing
the outcome of the monitoring process and updating his beliefs appropriately
by use of Bayes’ rule, the principal makes a firing decision F ∈ {0, 1}, where
F = 1 means that an agent is fired. Firing costs in the trial period are zero,
while in the second period they are prohibitively high.6 It is assumed that
5As explained in the Introduction, this view is for example broadly confirmed in a field
experiment reported in Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and Taylor (2002). Alternatively, we
could assume that good types face effort costs which are lower on average than those of
bad types. This would not change our arguments qualitatively.
6Once again, the qualitative nature of our results would not change if firing costs after
probation were high but finite.
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the population out of which the N agents are drawn is sufficiently large such
that, upon monitoring one agent, no inference can be made about the pool
composition of the remaining N − 1 agents.
As for payments, we denote by ti the transfer from the principal to each
agent. During probation, the transfer t1 could in principle be set equal to
zero, although in most situations it would be natural to imagine that some
kind of “show-up fee” t1 > 0 is paid to the worker independently of the
probation outcome. In the case of period 2, if the worker is hired at the
end of probation, he cannot be fired later in the sense that he is in any case
entitled to a transfer t2 > t1 independently of his performance. We also make
the following assumption:
Assumption 1. v2 > t2 > 1
which implies that the payoff for the principal from each agent who exerts
effort in period 2 is positive (v2 > t2). Furthermore, as explained below,
t2 > 1 implies that in period 1, exerting effort is privately optimal for a bad
agent for any value of c when he is monitored with certainty.
Given Assumption 1, and coming back to the firing decision, we want
the principal to wish to continue with an agent when his belief after the
monitoring process is greater or equal to the prior α.7 This will imply that
the following assumption must hold:
Assumption 2. α · (v2 − t2) + (1− α) · (−t2) > 0
Summarizing, the game has the following stages:
• At stage 0, each agent’s type is determined by a nature’s move and is
only known to the agent.
7We can alternatively assume that an agent cannot be fired without being monitored.
This would for example be consistent with legal practice in the US, see Krueger (1991).
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• At stage 1, the principal sets and commits to a monitoring probability
q for the probation period.
• At stage 2 period 1 begins and each agent independently decides on
whether or not to exert effort. After the effort choice is made, each
agent is monitored with probability q.
• At stage 3, given the outcome of the monitoring procedure, the princi-
pal decides on which agents to fire. After the firing decision period 1
ends.
• At stage 4, in period 2, all remaining agents again decide on whether
or not to exert effort. Then the game ends.
3.1 Equilibrium Behavior of the Agents
Let us start the analysis of the game at stage 4, and denote by aθi ∈ {E, S}
the action chosen by type θ ∈ {B, G} in period i = 1, 2. Equilibrium values
carry an asterisk ∗. We start with a good type: Since he has no effort costs, he
is indifferent between exerting effort and shirking (both actions yield a payoff
of t2). Throughout we assume that both types exert effort when indifferent,
so that good types will always choose aG∗2 = E in period 2.
8 Contrary to that,
in period 2, a bad type gets (t2−k · c) from choosing E and t2 from choosing
S so that bad types will always shirk in period 2, i.e. aB∗2 (c) ≡ S ∀c > 0.
Let us now look at the principal’s optimal firing decision at stage 3 after
monitoring has been carried out. Denote by β ∈ [0, 1] the belief of facing a
good type conditional on the outcome of the monitoring process:
β := Pr(θ = G | M) (1)
8All we need is that the expected payoff for the principal in period 2 from having a
good (bad) type is positive (negative).
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Of course, in (a Bayesian perfect) equilibrium, whenever possible, this has to
be consistently derived using Bayes’ rule from the equilibrium strategies of
each type of agent at stage 2 (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). Given
that good types will exert effort while bad types will always shirk in period
2, the principal’s expected payoff from an agent for period 2 as a function of
β is given by
β(v2 − t2) + (1− β)(−t2) (2)
which may be positive or negative. It follows that the principal will fire an
agent, whenever monitoring “delivers” a belief for this agent to be a good
type which is sufficiently low:
F ∗(β) =
{
1 if β < t2
v2
0 otherwise
. (3)
Now consider the optimal effort decision at stage 2 by each type for a given
probability of monitoring q. In doing so, we directly look at the following
equilibrium continuation and then see how it can be supported:
Lemma 1. At stage 2, for all q < q := 1
t2
, there exists a unique equilibrium
continuation in which
a) each good type chooses aG∗1 = E independent of q,
b) each bad types shirks whenever his realization of c is sufficiently high. This
happens with probability (1− e(q)) > 0,9
c) the principal’s beliefs after monitoring has been carried out are given by
β∗ = Pr(θ = G | M = E) = α
α + (1− α)e(q) > α (4)
β∗ = Pr(θ = G | M = S) = 0 (5)
and the principal optimally fires all agents for whom M = S holds and thus
keeps all other agents (including those who have not been monitored).
9The exact definition of e(q) is given in Eqn. 9 below.
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For an intuition for Lemma 1, let us start with a good type: On the
equilibrium path, when choosing E, he gets t1 in period 1, and t2 in period 2:
if he is monitored, this will lead to M = E and so the principal holds the belief
β∗ = α
α+(1−α)e(q) > α for which, by Assumption 2, F = 0 is optimal. If he is
not monitored, the principal holds belief β∗ = α and he is not fired either.
On the other hand, when choosing S in the first period, his payoff is still t1
since he does not save in effort costs. But with probability q, he is monitored,
found to be shirking and, given belief β∗ = Pr(θ = G | M = S) = 0, fired.
It follows that his expected payoff for period 2 is only (1− q)t2 and, thus, a
deviation is never profitable.
Now consider a bad type: When choosing E, he gets (t1 − c) in period
1. When monitoring occurs, he is taken to be a good type and thus will also
get t2 in period 2 in which he will then shirk, so that he will not again incur
any cost of effort in that period. On the other hand, when choosing S, he
gets t1 in period 1 (thus saving on effort costs c), but with probability q he
is found to be shirking and fired, so that his expected payoff for period 2 is
only (1− q)t2. It follows that S is preferred iff
t1 − c + t2 < t1 + (1− q)t2 ⇔ c > qt2 (6)
so that the optimal decision of a bad type as a function of q and c is given
by
aB∗1 (q, c) =
{
S if c > qt2
E otherwise
(7)
i.e. shirking occurs whenever effort costs are sufficiently high. This means
that for q ≥ q := 1
t2
, all bad types choose E independent of their cost
parameter c. The threshold q relates the benefit from employment in period
2 (t2) to the maximum cost of effort during probation which is equal to 1.
Clearly, when t2 is relatively large, then q is low, which means that shirking
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in period 1 is undesirable for a bad agent given the prize at stake. Thus, even
a relatively low level of q would induce all bad agents to exert effort as long as
q is set greater or equal than q. In this case, shirking would no longer occur
on the equilibrium path so that there would be no information transmission
in equilibrium and β∗ = Pr(θ = G | M = E) = α would hold. This in
turn would allow for a plethora of pooling equilibria, since Bayes’ rule would
have no bite in case of M = S because this is then a zero probability event.
However, we will show below that it is indeed optimal for the principal to
choose some q < q so that both possible actions, E and S, occur with positive
probability on the equilibrium path. Therefore, there is no leeway in forming
off-equilibrium beliefs and so this equilibrium continuation is indeed unique.10
Finally, note that the principal’s beliefs conditional on M are consistent with
the equilibrium strategies of both types.
3.2 The Principal’s Optimal Choice of q
It remains to be determined the optimal choice of q at stage 1, under the
assumption that the equilibrium continuation as derived in Lemma 1 is played
subsequently. Clearly, the principal’s objective is to maximize her expected
payoff. Let us analyze each part of it in turn:
Good Types: In period 1, there are α ·N good types, none of them shirks
in equilibrium and therefore none of them is fired. Since for simplicity we
assumed a negligible output during probation, they yield a negative payoff
(−t1) to the principal, but the important point is that this payoff is indepen-
dent of the monitoring probability q. In period 2, there is again no shirking
and each of the α ·N good types yields the principal (v2 − t2) > 0, which is
again independent of q. This means that the choice of q neither influences
10We confine attention to pure strategy equilibria.
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the number of good types in each period nor their choice of effort. Therefore,
in what follows, we can neglect the payoff accruing from good types as it will
have no effect on the optimal level of q.
Bad Types: Recall that a bad type will shirk in period 1 whenever c > qt2.
Thus, from the principal’s point of view, the probabilities of shirking and
exerting effort are given by, respectively,
s(q) := Pr(c > qt2) = max(0, 1−H(qt2)) (8)
e(q) := Pr(c ≤ qt2) = min(H(qt2), 1). (9)
Clearly we have ds
dq
≤ 0 and de
dq
≥ 0 and s′(q) = −e′(q).
Since there are (1 − α) · N bad types, the expected payoff generated by
them in period 1 is:
π1(q) := (1− α) ·N · (e(q) · (−t1) + s(q) · (−t1))
= (1− α) ·N · (−t1)) (10)
because e(q) + s(q) = 1. Note that this term is also independent of q. This
highlights the fact that in period 1 the principal monitors workers not so much
because she is interested in their output, which in this period is negligible,
but mainly because she needs to detect bad workers.
In other words, from the principal’s point of view, monitoring in period
1 matters only because it influences the number of bad types in period 2.
And precisely for this reason q must be set in a way that induces some
shirking in period 1, otherwise no bad type would be detectable. Formally,
the number of bad types in period 2 is determined as follows: Each bad type
shirks with probability s(q) but gets detected only with probability q so that
(1− α) ·N · (1− q) · s(q) bad types remain in period 2. Moreover, each bad
type exerts effort with probability e(q) and is thus not identified through
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monitoring so that another (1 − α) · N · e(q) of them survive the probation
period. Taking this together, since each bad types generates a payoff of (−t2)
to the principal, her expected payoff from the bad types in period 2 is given
by
π2(q) := (1− α) ·N · ((1− q) · s(q) + e(q)) · (−t2). (11)
We can therefore state the following result concerning the optimal monitoring
frequency q∗:
Proposition 1. Given equilibrium continuation 1, the optimal monitoring
frequency for the principal induces shirking on the equilibrium path, i.e. 0 <
q∗ < q := 1
t2
< 1.
Proof. We proceed along the following lines: Since the objective function of
the principal is continuous in the interval [0, q),
i) we show that the expected payoff of the principal is strictly increasing at
q = 0 and strictly decreasing as q → q.
ii) we show that the absolute expected profit level is also higher at q = q∗
than at q = 0 and when q approaches q (the payoff function of the principal
is flat for all q ≥ q).
To do this, define
Z(q) := [(1− q)s(q) + e(q)](−t2) = [(1− q)(1− e(q)) + e(q)](−t2)
= [(1− q + qe(q)](−t2) (12)
where
Z ′(q) = [−1 + e(q) + qe′(q)](−t2). (13)
Recall that the expected payoff from the good agents and from the bad
agents in period 1, respectively, is independent of q. Furthermore, from (11),
π2(q) = (1− α) ·N · Z(q) so that q∗ is uniquely determined by Z(q).
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ad i): We need to show that Z ′(q = 0) > 0 and Z ′(q → 1
t2
) < 0:
Z ′(q = 0) = t2 > 0
Z ′(q → 1
t2
) = (−t2) · [−1 + 1
t2
· e′( 1
t2
) + 1] = −e′( 1
t2
) < 0
ad ii): Note that we have
Z(0) = Z(
1
t2
) = −t2
Z(q∗) = (1− e(q∗) + q∗ · e(q∗))(−t2)
and thus
Z(q∗)− Z(0) > 0 ⇔
(1− e(q∗) + q∗ · e(q∗))(−t2) > (−t2) ⇔
e(q∗) < 1
which is true for all q∗ < q. Thus, the principal’s payoff is strictly higher
when an interior level of q is chosen.
Note first that q∗ < q implies that the behavior determined in the equi-
librium continuation (see Lemma 1) is also optimal and so Lemma 1 together
with Proposition 1 characterize indeed the unique equilibrium of this game.
Intuitively when q is too low, only few bad agents are identified while
when q is too high, each bad agent is less likely to shirk in period 1 and
thus cannot be identified through monitoring either. As bad types shirk
with probability 1 in period 2 (yielding a negative payoff −t2 < 0), too much
monitoring is not in the principal’s interest. Note that this argument does
not rely on monitoring costs which are assumed to be zero.
To give an account of the potential magnitude of the gain induced by
setting q optimally, we now calculate the percentage gain in profits for the
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principal from monitoring with probability q = q∗ compared to monitoring
excessively (q → q) or refraining from monitoring at all (q = 0). Using Eqn.
(11), we denote by d(q) the probability that a bad type remains in period 2,
i.e.
d(q) := (1− q)s(q) + e(q) = 1− q · s(q) (14)
which simply reflects the fact that a bad agent can only be fired if he shirks
in period 1 and is detected through monitoring. Note that d(q = 0) =
1 = d(q ≥ q) which implies that all bad agents remain in period 2 and the
principal’s payoff in either of these two cases is
π2(q = 0) = π2(q → q) = (1− α) ·N · (−t2). (15)
When q∗ is chosen, instead, the probability that a bad type remains in
period 2 is strictly less than 1 , i.e. d(q∗) = 1 − q∗ · s(q∗) < 1. Thus, the
principal is able to filter out at least some of the bad types so that her payoff
is
π2(q = q
∗) = (1− α) ·N · (1− q∗ · s(q∗)) · (−t2). (16)
By taking the difference between (16) and (15), her absolute gain from choos-
ing an “interior” monitoring frequency q∗ is:
∆π := π2(q = q
∗)− π2(q = 0)
= (1− α) ·N · (−q∗ · s(q∗)) · (−t2) > 0 (17)
Relative to the payoff obtained in the “corner” solutions given by Eqn. (15),
the percentage increase in profits can thus be calculated as
∆π
|π2(q = 0)| = q
∗ · s(q∗). (18)
To further illustrate this result, consider the case where c is uniformly
distributed, i.e. H(c) = c. Using (9), we then have e(q) = min(qt2, 1) and
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maximizing π2(q) in Eqn. (11) with respect to q yields q
∗ = 1
2t2
and thus
e(q∗) = s(q∗) = 1
2
. Therefore, from Eqn. (18) the percentage gain is given
by 1
4t2
= 1
4
q.11
This example highlights a corollary implication of our model. Not only
is it never optimal to monitor too much during probation, as suggested by
Proposition 1, but, in addition, when q is low because the value of employ-
ment is high, probation is not a very effective device to filter out bad agents
even if the monitoring probability is set optimally to q∗ < q. On the other
hand, in the opposite case in which q is high, i.e. when the (maximum) cost
of effort in period 1 is high compared to the benefit from employment in
period 2, the principal can achieve considerable gains by having probation
periods in which monitoring is used as a selection device. Even in this case,
however, it would never be optimal to set the monitoring probability q∗ above
q.
4 Conclusions and Extensions
We have shown in this paper that monitoring a partner too much in the initial
phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine her
loyalty to the match and if the cost of terminating the relationship increases
over time. If too much monitoring induces the partner to behave well even
if her inclination in the absence of monitoring would be to mis-behave, the
principal does not learn what needs to be learned at the beginning of a
relationship. Note that this mechanism is completely independent of the
11It may be worth noting that our result also bears some analogy to the standard
monopoly model and to the idea underlying the so-called Laffer-Curve. In the first case,
compared to the competitive outcome, a monopolist can increase its profit by setting a
higher price although total sales will be lower. In the second case, by setting a low tax
rate a government is able to generate a higher tax income since this increases the tax base.
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costs of monitoring, and thus the result holds even if monitoring is costless.
This general intuition applies to many social relationships characterized by
asymmetric information with respect to the types of agents, like for example,
labor and marriage contracts.
Our streamlined framework allows us to derive our basic result in its
purest form at the cost of some simplifications. For example, the assump-
tion of negligible output in the probation period or the assumption that the
principal cannot set up an incentive scheme in period 2 to elicit some effort
from bad types. Note however that removing these assumptions would com-
plicate the analysis without changing the fundamental nature of the trade-off
highlighted by our paper. For example, a positive v1 would clearly increase
the optimal monitoring probability q∗, but as long as output in period 2 is
what really matters for the principal, our story would not change qualita-
tively. And even if it were possible to design an incentive scheme capable of
eliciting effort from bad types in period 2, such a scheme would probably be
costly and imperfect in reality, leaving the principal with the need to perform
at least some screening during the initial phase of the relationship. Thus,
even in a more general setting, the principal is interested in increasing the
number of bad agents detected during probation.
As a corollary of our analysis we also show that the use of probation
periods, together with monitoring during such periods, is beneficial to the
principal only when agents perceive a benefit from future interaction which
is not too large in comparison to the cost of exerting effort during probation.
Only in these cases the optimal monitoring probability can be set high enough
to allow for the detection of some bad agents and at the same times bad
agents may be induced to shirk even during probation. On the contrary,
when an agent’s future benefit from the relationship is perceived to be too
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high, the probability of monitoring that would induce some shirking among
bad types would have to be too low, and as a result very few bad types would
be detected. In these cases, our model suggests that probation would be a
waste of time as a method to detect bad agents through monitoring.
Although at this stage our paper has essentially a normative flavor, in
terms of positive analysis it suggests that relationships in which too much
monitoring takes place at the beginning should perform worse at later stages
of their development. In particular, everything else being equal, a larger
fraction of less loyal agents, or a higher probability of not loyal behavior from
a single agent, should emerge in the long run when the principal monitors
agents too much at the beginning. What comes next in our research agenda
is to explore the possibility of providing empirical evidence on this testable
prediction of our model.
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